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Previous studies have linked higher emotional inertia (i.e., a stronger autoregressive
slope of emotions) with lower well-being. We aimed to replicate these findings, while
extending upon previous research by addressing a number of unresolved issues and
controlling for potential confounds. Specifically, we report results from two studies
(Ns = 100 and 202) examining how emotional inertia, assessed in response to a
standardized sequence of emotional stimuli in the lab, correlates with several measures
of well-being. The current studies build on previous research by examining how inertia
of both positive emotions (PE) and negative emotions (NE) relates to positive (e.g., life
satisfaction) and negative (e.g., depressive symptoms) indicators of well-being, while
controlling for between-person differences in the mean level and variability of emotions.
Our findings replicated previous research and further revealed that (a) NE inertia was
more strongly associated with lower well-being than PE inertia; (b) emotional inertia
correlated more consistently with negative indicators (e.g., depressive symptoms) than
positive indicators (e.g., life satisfaction) of well-being; and (c) these relationships were
independent of individual differences in mean level and variability of emotions. We
conclude, in line with recent findings, that higher emotional inertia, particularly of NE,
may be an indicator of increased vulnerability to depression.
Keywords: emotion dynamics, affect dynamics, emotional inertia, well-being, positive emotions, negative
emotions, film-clips, emotional context
INTRODUCTION
Emotions are not static, but are rather characterized by frequent ups and downs (Frijda,
2007; Scherer, 2009). Such emotional ﬂuctuations can be thought of as the outputs of an
aﬀective system that responds to external events and internal regulatory processes (Larsen,
2000; Kuppens et al., 2010b). A consensus is now emerging that individual diﬀerences in these
patterns of emotional ups and downs, referred to as aﬀect dynamics1, are important markers
of psychological functioning and well-being (Davidson, 1998, 2015; Hollenstein et al., 2013;
1The terms ‘aﬀect dynamics’ and ‘emotion dynamics’ are often used interchangeably in the literature (Kuppens, 2015).
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Houben et al., 2015; Trull et al., 2015; Wichers et al., 2015).
Thus, in addition to studying mean levels of emotion (i.e., trait
aﬀect), charting the patterns with which aﬀective states ﬂuctuate
and change over time may oﬀer novel insights into emotional
functioning.
Emotional Inertia and Well-Being
Here, we focus on a pattern of aﬀect dynamics labeled emotional
inertia, as captured by the autocorrelation of an emotional
trajectory over time. The autocorrelation of an emotion indicates
how strongly emotional intensity at a given time-point predicts
emotional intensity at the next time-point. Thus, higher
autocorrelations (i.e., higher inertia) reﬂect emotions that are
more self-predictable or resistant to change over time (Cook
et al., 1995; Suls et al., 1998; Kuppens et al., 2010a). Given
that a central function of emotions is to change in response
to events and regulatory eﬀorts (Larsen, 2000; Frijda, 2007;
Kuppens et al., 2010b), higher levels of inertia may indicate
that emotions have become decoupled from internal and/or
external contingencies, and may have thus become dysfunctional
(Kuppens et al., 2010a; Butler, 2011; Hollenstein et al., 2013). Put
otherwise, a high degree of emotional inertia may reﬂect a lack of
emotional ﬂexibility–the capacity to continually adapt emotional
responding to ﬂuctuating situational and regulatory demands–
which is considered essential to psychological health and well-
being (Kashdan and Rottenberg, 2010; Waugh et al., 2011;
Hollenstein et al., 2013; Hollenstein, 2015). We deﬁne well-being,
following Houben et al. (2015), as a broad construct comprising
lower levels of maladjustment [e.g., depressive symptoms,
negative aﬀectivity (NA)] or psychological vulnerability (e.g.,
neuroticism, habitual rumination) as well as higher levels
of ﬂourishing [e.g., positive aﬀectivity (PA), satisfaction with
life] or resilience (e.g., self-esteem, extraversion).2 Given the
ubiquity of emotions in human functioning, emotional ﬂexibility
would be expected to relate to a wide range of well-being
measures. This view is supported by a growing number of
studies linking higher emotional inertia with various indicators
of maladjustment, including neuroticism (Suls et al., 1998), low
self-esteem (Kuppens et al., 2010a), impaired social functioning
(Fairbairn and Sayette, 2013), habitual rumination (Koval et al.,
2012; Brose et al., 2014), elevated depressive symptoms (Wenze
et al., 2009; Koval and Kuppens, 2012; Koval et al., 2012, 2013;
Brose et al., 2014), and increased risk of Major Depressive
Disorder (Kuppens et al., 2012; van de Leemput et al., 2014).
Open Questions Regarding the
Association Between Emotional Inertia
and Well-Being
Endogenous versus Exogenous Influences
Although previous research has consistently linked emotional
inertia with lower well-being (Houben et al., 2015) a number of
important issues remain unresolved. First, research on emotional
inertia (especially inertia of subjective feelings) has relied heavily
on experience sampling or ecological momentary assessment
2An alternative label for this broad construct might be psychological functioning.
methods to study emotional ﬂuctuations in daily life (Houben
et al., 2015). Although studying aﬀect dynamics using naturalistic
methods has several advantages (e.g., high ecological validity),
a major shortcoming of this approach is a lack of control
over contextual factors. As a result, it is unclear whether
individual diﬀerences in emotional inertia in daily life are due
to endogenous (e.g., emotional reactivity and regulation) versus
exogenous (e.g., diﬀerential exposure to events) factors, or both.
Indeed, recent evidence suggests that higher inertia of negative
emotions in daily life is at least partly driven by exposure to more
intense negative events (Koval et al., 2015a). However, the only
way to conclusively demonstrate that heightened inertia is due
to processes endogenous to the individual, and therefore reﬂects
inﬂexible emotional responding, is to expose all individuals to the
same emotional events in the same order. We have previously
assessed emotional inertia in response to a standardized sequence
of stimuli and found a positive association between inertia of
negative emotions (NE) and depressive symptoms, supporting
the view that endogenously caused emotional inﬂexibility is
related to lower well-being (Koval et al., 2013). However, in
Koval et al. (2013), we calculated emotional inertia separately for
each individual using the within-person autocorrelation based
on only 11 occasions. In contrast, other studies have typically
estimated emotional inertia simultaneously for all individuals
using a multilevel autoregressive model, and using many more
time-points (e.g., Suls et al., 1998; Kuppens et al., 2010a; Koval
et al., 2012). Both the small number of time-points and the use
of a two-step analytic approach can undermine the reliability
of results (Wang et al., 2012). We address these limitations
in the current studies by increasing the number of time-
points used to model inertia and using multilevel autoregressive
models rather than calculating autocorrelations separately for
each individual.
Inertia of Positive Emotions
Second, it remains unclear under which circumstances higher
inertia of positive emotions (PE) is maladaptive. Theoretically,
emotional ﬂexibility is adaptive independent of valence (Kashdan
and Rottenberg, 2010; Hollenstein et al., 2013). Indeed, PE that
are slow to change across contexts may also indicate an aﬀective
system that has become disconnected from environmental
contingencies or regulatory processes (Kuppens et al., 2010a;
Gruber, 2011; Kuppens et al., 2012). In line with this, Houben
et al.’s (2015) meta-analysis found that higher inertia of PE was
consistently related to lower well-being, although to a lesser
extent than NE inertia. However, this ﬁnding may be driven
by studies examining inertia of positive emotional behaviors
assessed at a short timescale in the lab (Gottman et al., 2002;
Kuppens et al., 2012; Fairbairn and Sayette, 2013). In contrast,
research looking at inertia of positive feelings, typically assessed
at longer timescales and in daily life using experience sampling,
has produced less consistent results (Kuppens et al., 2010a; Höhn
et al., 2013; Koval et al., 2013). It is important to establish whether
these divergent ﬁndings are due to methodological diﬀerences
(i.e., short vs. long timescale; lab vs. daily life) or because of
diﬀerences in the dynamics of behavioral versus experiential
components of emotions (see also, Koval et al., 2015b). Studies
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assessing inertia of positive feelings at short timescales (i.e.,
seconds or minutes) in the lab are needed to answer this question.
Positive Indicators of Well-Being
Third, research on emotional inertia has mostly focused on
its associations with indicators of maladjustment (i.e., negative
indicators of well-being), such as neuroticism (Suls et al., 1998),
rumination (Koval et al., 2012), depressive symptoms (Koval
et al., 2013), and MDD diagnosis (Kuppens et al., 2012). In
contrast, very few studies have examined how emotional inertia
relates to ﬂourishing (i.e., positive indicators of well-being)
such as satisfaction with life, trait PA, or extraversion (Diener
et al., 1999). One exception, which has been associated with
lower inertia, is self-esteem (Kuppens et al., 2010a; Koval and
Kuppens, 2012). However, the overall bias in the literature on
emotional inertia toward indicators of maladjustment is reﬂected
in Houben et al.’s (2015) meta-analysis, which reported more
than twice as many eﬀect sizes linking emotional inertia with
negative than positive indicators of well-being. Redressing this
imbalance would help to determine whether higher inertia should
be considered an indicator of well-being in general, or rather only
a marker of maladjustment.
Emotional Inertia versus Emotional Variability
Finally, previous studies linking emotional inertia with lower
well-being have typically not controlled for individual diﬀerences
in the variability (e.g., within-person SD) of emotions (but see,
Koval et al., 2013). Although these two measures are distinct–
variability represents the overall range of an emotion over time
(regardless of the temporal order of emotional intensity levels),
whereas emotional inertia reﬂects the moment-to-moment
predictability or temporal dependency of emotions–they are
mathematically and empirically related (Wang et al., 2012; Koval
et al., 2013). Further complicating matters, inertia and variability
are sometimes combined into an overall index of emotional
instability, known as the mean square successive diﬀerence
(MSSD; Jahng et al., 2008; Wang et al., 2012). Importantly,
both greater variability (SD) and instability (MSSD) of emotions
have also been associated with lower well-being (Houben et al.,
2015). Thus, it remains unclear whether the negative association
between emotional inertia and well-being reported in previous
studies is (partly) driven by individual diﬀerences in variability.
Similarly, given that trait levels of positive and negative emotions
are known to correlate with other indicators of well-being
and psychological functioning (e.g., Watson et al., 1988a), it is
important to control for individual diﬀerences in mean level of
emotions when studying patterns of emotion dynamics, such as
emotional inertia (Trull et al., 2015).
The Present Studies
The current studies aimed to replicate and extend upon previous
research on the association between emotional inertia (of
subjective feelings) and well-being in two samples (Ns = 100
and 202) and meta-analyze ﬁndings across studies to arrive at
robust conclusions. Since most previous studies on the inertia of
feelings have relied on experience sampling, our ﬁrst aim was to
assess emotional inertia using a validated ﬁlm-task administered
in the lab. Second, we aimed to examine how the inertia of
negative and positive feelings is related to both positive (e.g., life
satisfaction) and negative (e.g., depressive symptoms) indicators
of well-being. Finally, because the association between emotional
inertia and well-being may be partly driven by mean levels
and variability (i.e., SD) of emotions (Jahng et al., 2008; Wang
et al., 2012; Koval et al., 2013), we modeled emotional inertia
using both raw (unstandardized) and within-person standardized
emotion ratings. The latter approach controls for between-person
diﬀerences in mean level and variability of emotions (Koval et al.,
2013). In line with previous theory and research, we predicted
that higher inertia of both NE and PE would be related to lower
well-being. Put otherwise, we expected inertia to be negatively
associated with positive indicators of well-being and positively
associated with negative indicators of well-being. Finally, based
on our previous ﬁndings (Koval et al., 2013) we predicted that
even after removing between-person diﬀerences in mean level
and variability of emotions, greater emotional inertia would
continue to be associated with lower well-being.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Ethics Statement
Both studies were approved by the ethics committee of the
Faculty of Psychology and Educational Sciences, KU Leuven. All
participants provided written informed consent.
Participants
Study 1
One hundred students (86% female), aged between 18 and
28 years (M = 20.77; SD = 2.15), were recruited from a large
database of volunteers maintained by the psychology department
at the KU Leuven and by advertising around university buildings.
Participants were reimbursed €8 for their time.
Study 2
As part of a broader three-wave longitudinal study on emotional
functioning, we aimed to recruit 200 students commencing their
ﬁrst year of tertiary education. We advertised at secondary
schools and tertiary education orientation/information sessions
in the Leuven area. To maximize variability in well-being,
we recruited an initial pool of 686 students (65.7% female)
to complete an online pre-screening using the Center for
Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale (CES-D; Radloﬀ, 1977)
and, using a stratiﬁed sampling approach (Ingram and Siegle,
2009), we invited an equal number of participants from each
quintile of the CES-D range to participate in the study. However,
this strategy was only partially successful: we were able to recruit
180 participants with a relatively broad range of CES-D pre-
screening scores (Range = 0–39; M = 14.41, SD = 8.41). To
achieve our original target sample size, we recruited an additional
22 participants after the study had already begun, who did not
complete the CES-D pre-screening. At the time of the study, these
additional 22 participants did not diﬀer signiﬁcantly on the CES-
D (M = 11.86, SD = 7.11) from the remainder of the sample
(M = 12.55, SD = 7.80), t(200) = 0.393, p = 0.695. The ﬁnal
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sample comprised 202 students (55% female) aged between 17
and 24 years (M = 18.32, SD= 0.96). Participants were eligible to
receive up to 60€ for their completion of all tasks in each wave
of the longitudinal study, plus an additional bonus of 60€ for
completing all three waves.
Procedure
In both Studies 1 and 2, participants attended the lab in small
groups and were individually seated in separate cubicles where
they completed a number of measures including the well-being
questionnaires and emotional ﬁlm-task, described below. Other
measures not directly relevant to the current investigation and
not reported here, were in Study 1: (a) resting heart rate,
(b) heart-beat counting task, and (c) several other self-report
questionnaires; and in Study 2: (a) structured clinical interviews;
(b) additional self-report questionnaires; (c) lab tasks assessing
cognitive and emotional functioning; and d) a 7-day experience
sampling protocol. No other measures or manipulations were
administered.
Well-Being Measures
Our selection of speciﬁc well-being measures was guided by
(i) a desire to represent a range of both positive indicators
of well-being (i.e., measures of ﬂourishing, or psychological
resilience) and negative indicators of well-being (i.e., measures
of maladjustment, or psychological vulnerability), and (ii) the
availability of identical (or highly similar) measures across both
studies to allow for synthesis of ﬁndings using meta-analysis.
For each well-being measure, we calculated mean scores (after
reverse-coding items, where required). Descriptive statistics and
correlations among all well-being measures are shown in Table 1.
Positive Indicators of Well-Being
Life satisfaction
Participants’ life satisfaction was assessed using the Satisfaction
with Life Scale (SWLS; Diener et al., 1985). The SWLS is
widely used to assess the cognitive component of subjective well-
being (Diener et al., 1999). Participants are asked to rate their
agreement with ﬁve items regarding global evaluations of their
life (e.g., “in most ways my life is close to my ideal”) on a scale
from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Cronbach’s α was
0.83 in both studies.
Self-esteem
Global self-esteem, which reﬂects a person’s satisfaction with
him/herself, is considered to be a component of subjective well-
being, at least in individualist cultures (Diener et al., 1999).
Self-esteem has also been related to improved mental and
physical health (Taylor and Brown, 1988; Mann et al., 2004).
Participants completed the Rosenberg Self-Esteem questionnaire
(RSE; Rosenberg, 1989), comprising 10 items (e.g., “on the
whole, I am satisﬁed with myself”) that assess global self-esteem.
Responses are on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 4 (strongly
agree). Cronbach’s αs were 0.87 and 0.90 in Studies 1 and 2,
respectively.
Positive aﬀectivity
Trait PA, reﬂecting the tendency to experience frequent and
intense positive feelings in daily life, was assessed with the
Positive and Negative Aﬀect Schedule (Watson et al., 1988b).
Participants rated how much they generally experience 10 high-
activation positive (e.g., “interested,” “excited”) feelings during
their normal daily lives using a scale from 1 (very slightly or not at
all) to 5 (extremely). Cronbach’s αs were 0.78 and 0.81 in Studies
1 and 2, respectively.
Extraversion
Extraversion has been related to higher levels of happiness
and well-being (Costa and McCrae, 1980; DeNeve and Cooper,
1998; Gale et al., 2013) and lower levels of psychopathology
(Trull and Sher, 1994). In Study 1, participants completed the
extraversion (E) subscale of the Big Five Inventory (John et al.,
2008), comprising eight items rated on a scale from 1 (strongly
disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). In Study 2, participants completed
the extraversion subscale of the Ten Item Personality Inventory
(Gosling et al., 2003), comprising two items rated on a scale from
1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Cronbach’s αs were 0.78
and 0.62 in Studies 1 and 2, respectively.
Negative Indicators of Well-Being
Depressive symptoms
Participants completed the CES-D (Radloﬀ, 1977), a 20-item
questionnaire assessing the frequency of depressive symptoms
(e.g., “I had crying spells”; “I felt depressed”) over the past week
on a scale from 0 (rarely or none of the time) to 3 (most or all of the
time). Elevated scores on the CES-D are indicative of distress and
poor well-being, and predict future clinical depression diagnosis
independent of other known risk factors (Klein et al., 2013).
Cronbach’s αs were 0.89 and 0.88 in Studies 1 and 2, respectively.
Rumination
Trait rumination is related to poor well-being, and increased
vulnerability for many psychopathologies, including depression,
anxiety, substance abuse, and eating disorders (Nolen-Hoeksema
et al., 2008). Participants completed the Ruminative Responses
Scale (RRS; Treynor et al., 2003), a 22-item measure of the
tendency to habitually ruminate (e.g., to think “Why can’t I
handle things better?”) in response to episodes of sad or depressed
mood. Responses were on scale from 1 (almost never) to 4 (almost
always). Cronbach’s αs were 0.88 and 0.90 in Studies 1 and 2,
respectively.
Negative aﬀectivity
Trait NA, reﬂecting the tendency to experience frequent and
intense negative feelings in daily life, was assessed with the
Positive and Negative Aﬀect Schedule (Watson et al., 1988b).
Participants rated how much they generally experience 10 high-
activation negative (e.g., “irritable” “upset”) feelings during their
normal daily lives on a scale from 1 (very slightly or not at all) to
5 (extremely). Cronbach’s αs were 0.86 and 0.84 in Studies 1 and
2, respectively.
Neuroticism
In Study 1, participants completed the neuroticism (N) subscale
of the Big Five Inventory (John et al., 2008), comprising eight
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TABLE 1 | Descriptive statistics and correlations among well-being measures.




Possible Actual M SD Possible Actual M SD SWLS RSE PA E CESD RRS NA N
Life Satisfaction
(SWLS)
1–7 2.6–7.0 5.20 0.99 1–7 2.4–6.8 5.17 1.01 0.66 0.42 0.25 –0.55 –0.39 –0.31 –0.35
Self-Esteem (RSE) 1–4 1.8–4.0 3.30 0.51 1–4 1.2–4.0 3.08 0.58 0.61 0.45 0.31 –0.61 –0.53 –0.43 –0.48
Positive Affectivity
(PA)
1–5 2.3–4.5 3.42 0.51 1–5 2.0–4.7 3.34 0.52 0.37 0.51 0.39 –0.42 –0.27 –0.12 –0.26
Extraversion (E) 1–5 2.4–5.0 3.59 0.56 1–7 1.5–7.0 4.87 1.31 0.39 0.29 0.44 –0.22 –0.24 –0.20 –0.07
Depression (CESD) 0–3 0.0–1.5 0.55 0.39 0–3 0.0–1.9 0.62 0.39 –0.55 –0.56 –0.28 –0.33 0.58 0.50 0.51
Rumination (RRS) 1–4 1.1–3.2 1.79 0.45 1–4 1.0–3.2 1.90 0.46 –0.34 –0.34 –0.09 –0.14 0.53 0.48 0.45
Negative Affectivity
(NA)
1–5 1.0–3.4 1.84 0.60 1–5 1.0–4.2 1.98 0.55 –0.46 –0.49 –0.07 –0.19 0.63 0.38 0.59
Neuroticism (N) 1–5 1.1–4.4 2.94 0.70 1–7 1.0–7.0 3.27 1.33 –0.31 –0.52 –0.35 –0.08 0.58 0.35 0.62
Correlations between well-being measures in Study 1 (N = 100) are shown below the diagonal. Correlations between well-being measures in Study 2 (N = 202) are
shown above the diagonal. Correlations shown in bold are statistically significant at p < 0.001.
items rated on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly
agree). In Study 2, neuroticism was assessed with the two-item
neuroticism subscale of the Ten Item Personality Inventory
(Gosling et al., 2003), rated on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree)
to 7 (strongly agree). Neuroticism is a major risk factor for poor
mental and physical health (Lahey, 2009) and is associated with
lower levels of well-being (Costa and McCrae, 1980; DeNeve and
Cooper, 1998; Gale et al., 2013) Cronbach’s αs were 0.83 and 0.59
in Studies 1 and 2, respectively.
Emotional Film-Task
This task was a slightly modiﬁed version of the task described in
Koval et al. (2013). The task was programmed and administered
using E-prime (Psychology Software Tools, Inc.). Participants
watched 10 emotional ﬁlm-clips (four negative, four positive, and
two neutral), shown in a ﬁxed order, and rated their subjective
experiences of PE and NE following each ﬁlm. To ensure
ratings reﬂected momentary emotional responses to the ﬁlms,
participants were instructed to rate their current feelings rather
than how they felt that day or in general. To reduce demand
eﬀects, participants were encouraged to rate their emotions
honestly and intuitively, rather than in terms of how they thought
a person should feel after seeing each ﬁlm-clip. These instructions
were reinforced by imposing a 10 s time limit for completing
each emotion rating (reduced to 5 s in Study 2 due to time
limitations). We adapted the original task by adding a 30 s
“rest” after each ﬁlm-clip (reduced to 20 s in Study 2 due to
time restrictions). During rest, participants were asked to keep
their attention on the screen (displaying a neutral image of a
ball of colored string), and subsequently rated their subjective
feelings. Thus, participants rated their feelings of PE and NE
on 21 occasions (at baseline, following each of the 10 ﬁlms,
following each of the 10 rests). At each occasion, participants
rated how sad, angry, depressed, anxious, relaxed, and happy
they felt on a scale from 0 (not at all) to 6 (very much).
The task began with a practice trial (participants watched a
neutral ﬁlm-clip and completed ratings of PE and NE), which
was not included in the analyses. Ratings on the four negative
items and two positive items were averaged to form NE and
PE scales, respectively. Following Nezlek (2012), we estimated
within-person reliabilities of the NE and PE scales using three-
level unconditional models. NE reliabilities were 0.76 (Study 1)
and 0.80 (Study 2). PE reliabilities were 0.62 (Study 1) and 0.76
(Study 2).
Data Analyses
Given that participants repeatedly rated their emotions in
response to the Emotional Film-Task, the resulting data can
be thought of as nested or multilevel, with measurement
occasions (Level-1) nested within participants (Level-2). To
account for the resulting non-independence and provide
appropriate estimates of standard errors, we analyzed data
using multilevel modeling (Bolger and Laurenceau, 2013).
Speciﬁcally, we ran two-level autoregressive (AR1) models,
including both a random intercept and a random (autoregressive)
slope in each model. We conducted separate analyses for
PE and NE, and separately using raw and within-person
standardized emotion ratings. Separate analyses examined how
each measure of well-being correlated with individual diﬀerences
in inertia of PE or NE. Further details of these models,
including model equations, are provided below. All multilevel
analyses were conducted using HLM 7.01 (Raudenbush et al.,
2013).
Raw Emotion Ratings
In line with previous research on emotional inertia (e.g., Suls
et al., 1998; Kuppens et al., 2010a), we usedmultilevelmodeling to
estimate associations between well-being and emotional inertia,
based on the raw emotion scores obtained from the ﬁlm-task.
At Level-1, we modeled the ﬁrst-order autoregressive slope of
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emotions (representing emotional inertia), as shown in Eq. 1,
below:
Level-1 (Occasions):
Emotionti = π0i + π1i(Emotiont−1i) + eti (1)
Here, the outcome at Level-1 (Emotionti) represents person
i’s level of emotion at time t. The autoregressive slope (π1 i)
reﬂects how strongly person i’s level of emotion at time t is
related to their level of emotion at time t – 1, the previous
occasion. This autoregressive slope is a direct operationalization
of emotional inertia (e.g., Suls et al., 1998). The lagged predictor
(Emotiont − 1i) was person-mean centered to remove between-
person diﬀerences from Level-1 parameter estimates (Enders
and Toﬁghi, 2007).3 As a result, the Level-1 intercept (π0 i) is
practically equal to each person i’s mean level of emotion across
all occasions. The Level-1 intercept and slope were allowed to
vary randomly across persons at Level-2, and their associations
with well-being were modeled, as shown in Eqs 2 and 3, below.
Level-2 (Persons):
π0i = β00 + β01(zWell-Beingi) + r0i (2)
π1i = β10 + β11(zWell-Beingi) + r1i (3)
Well-being measures were converted to z-scores before being
entered at Level-2. Thus, of direct relevance to this report, the
Level-2 intercept (β10) reﬂects the average level of emotional
inertia across the sample, and the Level-2 slope (β11) reﬂects the
association between well-being and emotional inertia. These β11
values are displayed in Tables 3 and 4, and can be interpreted as
standardized regression weights. For instance, if β11 = 0.10, an
individual scoring 1 SD above the sample-mean on the measure
of well-being is predicted to have an emotional inertia level
0.10 units higher than the sample average, whereas a person
scoring 1 SD below the sample-mean on well-being is predicted
to have an emotional inertia level 0.10 units lower than average.
Note that the autoregressive slope reﬂecting emotional inertia is
comparable to an autocorrelation and typically ranges between 0
and 1 (Hamaker, 2012).
Within-Person Standardized Emotion Ratings
Our previous research has demonstrated the importance of
controlling for individual diﬀerences inmean level and variability
of emotions when examining associations between emotional
inertia and well-being (Koval et al., 2013).We therefore replicated
all analyses using within-person standardized emotion ratings.
Emotion scores were standardized per individual by subtracting
each person’s mean emotion rating (across all occasions) from
their emotion rating at each occasion, and then dividing by the SD
3Hamaker and Grasman (2015) recommend person-mean centering the lagged
predictor when examining associations between the autoregressive slope (i.e.,
emotional inertia) and Level-2 predictors (e.g., well-being), but not when
estimating the average level of emotional inertia (see below).
of the person’s emotion ratings (across all occasions), as shown in
Eq. 4, below.4
zEmotionti = Emotionti − EmotioniSD(Emotion)i (4)
These standardized emotion scores were analyzed using
multilevel models identical to those shown in Eqs 1–3, with
the exception that the lagged predictor was not person-
mean centered. Person-mean centering is not required because
the within-person standardized emotion ratings have already
removed all between-person diﬀerences in mean level and
variability.
Meta-Analyses
To identify consistent ﬁndings across studies, we meta-analyzed
results from Studies 1 and 2 using Comprehensive Meta-Analysis
(CMA; Borenstein et al., 2005). Following the approach used by
(Houben et al., 2015), estimates obtained from multilevel models
were converted to Pearson correlations based on their p-values
and degrees of freedom (Lipsey and Wilson, 2001). We then
computed the average eﬀect size (i.e., correlation) across Studies
1 and 2 using random-eﬀects models in CMA.
RESULTS
Preliminary Analyses: Average Levels of
Emotional Inertia
We estimated average levels of NE and PE inertia in each
sample using multilevel models identical to those described
above, but with no Level-2 predictors. Following Hamaker and
Grasman (2015), lagged predictors were entered uncentered
in these initial analyses to obtain unbiased estimates of
average emotional inertia levels in each sample. As shown in
Table 2, across both studies autoregressive slopes were positive
(0.151 ≤ β10 ≤ 0.397) and statistically signiﬁcant (ps < 0.001)
indicating that both PE and NE showed signiﬁcant moment-to-
moment predictability.
Associations Between Well-Being and
Emotional Inertia
Results of multilevel models estimating associations
between NE and PE inertia with positive and negative
indicators of well-being are shown in Tables 3 and 4,
respectively. Given the large number of results, we focus
our discussion on ﬁndings that were consistent across studies
and analytic methods (i.e., raw vs. standardized emotion
ratings).
Positive Indicators of Well-Being
Of the positive indicators of well-being included in the current
studies, only self-esteem showed consistent associations with
4Two participants in Study 1 showed no variation in their NE ratings in the ﬁlm-
task (i.e., SD = 0), and were therefore excluded from analyses using standardized
NE ratings.
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TABLE 2 | Results of multilevel autoregressive models estimating average levels of emotional inertia.
Study 1 (N = 100) Study 2 (N = 202)
Fixed effect (β10) Random effect (r1) Fixed effect (β10) Random effect (r1)
Model Est. (SE) 95% CI SD Est. (SE) 95% CI SD
LL UL LL UL
NE inertia (Raw) 0.40 (0.02) 0.35 0.45 0.10 0.33 (0.02) 0.29 0.36 0.11
NE inertia (Standardized)a 0.25 (0.03) 0.20 0.30 0.14 0.22 (0.02) 0.19 0.25 0.06
PE inertia (Raw) 0.31 (0.02) 0.26 0.36 0.09 0.25 (0.02) 0.22 0.29 0.09
PE inertia (Standardized) 0.22 (0.02) 0.17 0.26 0.06 0.15 (0.01) 0.12 0.18 0.02
Fixed effect estimates representing average levels of emotional inertia are significantly different from zero at p < 0.001.
an = 98 for analyses using standardized NE scores in Study 1.
emotional inertia across studies and analytic methods (see
meta-analysis in Table 3). Replicating previous ﬁndings, self-
esteem was negatively associated with NE inertia (Houben et al.,
2015). However, whereas previous studies (e.g., Kuppens et al.,
2010a) have also reported a negative association between self-
esteem and inertia of PE, the evidence for such an association
was weaker in the current studies. In particular, when PE
scores were standardized there was no longer a signiﬁcant
association between PE inertia and self-esteem. Thus, while
individuals with higher self-esteem clearly showed lower levels
of NE inertia, the association between self-esteem and PE
inertia was weaker and appeared to be partly accounted for by
individual diﬀerences in mean level or variability of emotions.
These ﬁndings are broadly consistent with Houben et al.’s
(2015) meta-analysis, which found that self-esteem was more
strongly related to the inertia of NE than PE. However, the
current studies extend upon Houben et al.’s (2015) synthesis
of previous studies by demonstrating that the association
between self-esteem and NE inertia replicates (a) in a highly
controlled laboratory context and (b) while controlling for
between-person diﬀerences in the mean level and variability
of NE.
TABLE 3 | Results of multilevel autoregressive models estimating associations between emotional inertia and positive indicators of well-being.
Study 1 (N = 100)a Study 2 (N = 202) Meta-analysis
95% CI 95% CI 95% CI
Well-being measure Est. (SE) LL UL p Est. (SE) LL UL p r LL UL p
Life satisfaction
NE inertia (Raw) −0.01 (0.03) –0.07 0.04 0.644 −0.04 (0.02) –0.08 −0.01 0.014 –0.13 –0.24 –0.01 0.030
NE inertia (Standardized) −0.02 (0.03) –0.07 0.03 0.505 −0.03 (0.02) –0.06 0.00 0.061 –0.11 –0.22 0.00 0.055
PE inertia (Raw) −0.01 (0.02) –0.06 0.03 0.595 −0.02 (0.02) –0.05 0.02 0.383 –0.06 –0.17 0.05 0.309
PE inertia (Standardized) 0.00 (0.02) –0.04 0.04 0.948 −0.01 (0.02) –0.04 0.02 0.341 –0.04 –0.16 0.07 0.458
Self-esteem
NE inertia (Raw) −0.03 (0.02) –0.08 0.02 0.187 −0.03 (0.02) –0.06 0.00 0.050 –0.14 –0.25 –0.02 0.018
NE inertia (Standardized) −0.06 (0.02) –0.11 –0.01 0.015 −0.04 (0.01) –0.07 −0.01 0.011 –0.20 –0.31 –0.09 <0.001
PE inertia (Raw) −0.03 (0.02) –0.08 0.01 0.124 −0.03 (0.02) –0.06 0.00 0.074 –0.14 –0.25 –0.02 0.019
PE inertia (Standardized) −0.02 (0.02) –0.06 0.02 0.354 −0.02 (0.01) –0.04 0.01 0.243 –0.09 –0.20 0.03 0.137
Positive affectivity
NE inertia (Raw) −0.01 (0.02) –0.05 0.03 0.752 −0.02 (0.02) –0.05 0.01 0.252 –0.06 –0.18 0.05 0.263
NE inertia (Standardized) −0.03 (0.03) –0.09 0.03 0.327 0.00 (0.01) –0.03 0.02 0.746 –0.02 –0.13 0.10 0.768
PE inertia (Raw) 0.01 (0.02) –0.03 0.05 0.724 −0.02 (0.02) –0.05 0.01 0.250 –0.04 –0.16 0.07 0.459
PE inertia (Standardized) 0.00 (0.02) –0.04 0.04 0.891 −0.03 (0.01) –0.06 0.00 0.024 –0.09 –0.25 0.08 0.303
Extraversion
NE inertia (Raw) −0.04 (0.02) –0.09 0.01 0.084 0.00 (0.01) –0.03 0.02 0.827 –0.07 –0.25 0.12 0.484
NE inertia (Standardized) −0.07 (0.03) –0.12 –0.01 0.015 0.01 (0.01) –0.02 0.03 0.711 –0.10 –0.36 0.17 0.459
PE inertia (Raw) 0.02 (0.02) –0.03 0.07 0.395 0.01 (0.02) –0.03 0.05 0.642 0.05 –0.06 0.16 0.386
PE inertia (Standardized) 0.01 (0.02) –0.03 0.06 0.603 −0.01 (0.02) –0.04 0.02 0.686 0.00 –0.12 0.11 0.973
Meta-analysis results (based on random-effects models) show the average effect size, r, across Studies 1 and 2.
an = 98 for all analyses using standardized negative emotion scores in Study 1.
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Negative Indicators of Well-Being
In contrast to our ﬁndings for positive indicators of well-
being (see above), all four negative indicators of well-being
showed consistent positive associations with both NE and PE
inertia across studies and analytic methods (see meta-analysis
in Table 4). However, in line with Houben et al.’s (2015) meta-
analysis, NE inertia was more strongly associated with negative
indicators of well-being than PE inertia in the current studies.
Extending upon previous research, we found that associations
between negative indicators of well-being and NE inertia tended
to become stronger, on average, when examining standardized
NE scores. For instance, the average correlation between trait
rumination and NE inertia across studies was 0.19 and this
increased to 0.26 after standardizing NE ratings. In contrast,
associations with PE inertia became slightly weaker when
examining standardized PE ratings.
DISCUSSION
The current studies aimed to replicate and extend upon previous
research that has linked higher emotional inertia with reduced
well-being. Across two studies using a controlled laboratory
paradigm to assess individual diﬀerences in emotion dynamics,
we found consistent evidence for an association between higher
emotional inertia and lower well-being. In particular, higher
inertia of NE was most consistently and strongly associated
with higher scores on negative indicators of well-being (i.e.,
depressive symptoms, trait rumination, NA and neuroticism).
To a lesser extent, negative indicators of well-being were also
related to greater inertia of PE. Finally, higher NE inertia was
associated with lower levels of self-esteem. These ﬁndings are
broadly consistent with a recent meta-analysis of the literature on
emotion dynamics (Houben et al., 2015). However, the current
ﬁndings go beyond previous research by helping to address
a number of unresolved questions regarding the association
between emotional inertia and well-being. We discuss each of
these, in turn, below.
Endogenous versus Exogenous
Influences
Previous research has largely assessed emotional inertia in
naturalistic contexts (e.g., using experience sampling), leaving
open the possibility that individual diﬀerences in inertia are
driven by external/contextual factors. In contrast, the current
studies assessed emotional inertia using a controlled laboratory
paradigm, in which all participants responded to a standardized
sequence of emotional stimuli (i.e., ﬁlms). This methodology
allows us to rule out the inﬂuence of environmental factors on
individual diﬀerences in emotional inertia. Rather, in the current
studies, higher levels of emotional inertia reﬂect endogenously
driven emotional inﬂexibility. We can therefore conclude, for
instance, that the association between NE inertia and greater
depressive symptoms observed in the current studies must be due
to alterations in emotional responding (e.g., impaired recovery)
rather than to diﬀerential exposure to emotional events (see also,
Koval et al., 2015a).
Inertia of Positive versus Negative
Emotions
The current studies also extended upon previous research by
examining how inertia of both negative and positive feelings
relates to well-being. Although PE inertia was also signiﬁcantly
associated with lower well-being, this association was weaker
than for NE inertia, in line with a recent meta-analysis (Houben
et al., 2015). Thus, heightened NE inertia appears to be more
predictive of well-being than PE inertia. Nevertheless, the current
ﬁndings do not support the view that “happiness is best kept
stable” (Gruber et al., 2013). In contrast to Gruber et al.’s (2013)
ﬁndings, we found that greater moment-to-moment stability of
PE was signiﬁcantly correlated with higher depressive symptoms,
rumination, trait NA, neuroticism, and lower self-esteem. We
note that these divergent ﬁndings may be due to the use of
diﬀerent indices of emotion dynamics. Whereas the current
studies focused on the autoregressive slope of emotions, Gruber
et al. (2013) measured emotional variability and instability using
the SD and MSSD, respectively (see Koval et al., 2013). Another
important issue to consider when interpreting indices of PE and
NE dynamics is the timescale at which emotions are assessed
(Hollenstein et al., 2013; Hollenstein, 2015). For instance, higher
levels of emotional variability or instability across hours or days
may reﬂect dysregulated emotions, whereas greater variablity
at shorter timescales (e.g., seconds, minutes) may be adaptive.
Remarkably, however, studies of emotional inertia at various
timescales from seconds (Kuppens et al., 2012) to minutes or
hours (Koval et al., 2013) and even days (Brose et al., 2014) have
consistently linked higher inertia (especially of NE) with lower
well-being. Finally, elevated PE inertia may be more pronouced
in speciﬁc clinical groups, such as among individuals with bipolar
disorder who may experience perseveratively high levels of PE
across contexts (Gruber, 2011).
Positive versus Negative Indicators of
Well-Being
The current studies also went beyond previous research by
assessing a broader range of well-being measures, including both
negative and positive indicators. Whereas all negative indicators
of well-being were signiﬁcantly associated with higher emotional
inertia, among positive well-being indicators only self-esteem
showed consistent negative associations with NE inertia across
studies and analytic methods. In contrast, PA, extraversion and
satisfaction with life were less strongly and consistently related
to emotional inertia. Thus, based on the current ﬁndings, it
would be fair to conclude that emotional inertia, particularly
of NE, is associated with higher levels of maladjustment and
lower self-esteem but not with positive indicators of well-being
more broadly. However, it may be premature to conclude that
emotional inertia is not related to positive indicators of well-
being until diﬀerent kinds of positive psychological functioning
(e.g., social connectedness, personal strengths, academic and
job satisfaction, relationship quality) are studied in relation to
emotional inertia. It is noteworthy, however, that each of the
well-being measures that was consistently associated with higher
emotional inertia in the current studies has been identiﬁed as
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a vulnerability factor for clinical depression, including elevated
depressive symptoms (Klein et al., 2013), higher neuroticism
(Lahey, 2009), the tendency to habitually ruminate (Nolen-
Hoeksema et al., 2008), higher levels of trait NA (Watson
et al., 1988a) and lower levels of self-esteem (Sowislo and
Orth, 2013). Thus, the current ﬁndings support recent evidence
suggesting that emotional inertia may be an early warning sign for
depression (van de Leemput et al., 2014). However, studies using
longitudinal measurement-burst designs (Röcke and Brose, 2013)
would be needed to conclusively demonstrate that emotional
inertia predicts the development of depression over time.
Emotional Inertia versus Emotional
Variability
Finally, an important contribution of the current studies is
that we estimated associations between emotional inertia and
well-being based on both raw and within-person standardized
emotion ratings. Analyses based on standardized scores ensure
that mean levels and variability (i.e., SD) of emotions are held
constant across individuals, allowing for a purer estimation
of the relationship betweeen temporal dependency (i.e.,
autocorrelation) of emotions and well-being. In particular, given
that numerous studies have linked higher emotional variability
with reduced well-being (Houben et al., 2015), it is important
to establish the distinct contribution of emotional inertia. We
note that in the current studies associations between NE inertia
and well-being remained signiﬁcant (even becoming stronger)
when analyzing standardized NE ratings. This corroborates
our previous claims that higher NE inertia is not merely an
artifact of greater variability or mean level of NE (Koval et al.,
2013). However, our ﬁndings diﬀered somewhat for PE inertia:
associations betwen PE inertia and well-being either remained
similar or became slightly weaker when controlling for individual
diﬀerences in mean level and variability of emotions. Clearly,
further research is needed to properly disentangle the roles of
mean level, variability and inertia of PE and NE in relation to
well-being. Novel statistical models that allow for simultaneous
estimation of the mean, variability and temporal dependency
of a process are promising in this regard (Wang et al., 2012;
Jongerling et al., 2015).
Limitations and Future Directions
The current studies are characterized by a number of limitations,
suggesting avenues for future research. First, the use of
predominantly female undergraduate samples limits the
generalizability of the current ﬁndings, especially given gender
(Nolen-Hoeksema, 2012) and age (Urry and Gross, 2010)
diﬀerences in emotion regulation processes, which play a central
role in shaping emotion dynamics. Thus, an important direction
for future research is to explore whether emotional inertia
shows similar associations with well-being across diﬀerent age
and gender groups. Second, while the current studies support
TABLE 4 | Results of multilevel autoregressive models estimating associations between emotional inertia and negative indicators of well-being.
Study 1 (N = 100)a Study 2 (N = 202) Meta-Analysis
95% CI 95% CI 95% CI
Well-Being Measure Est. (SE) LL UL p Est. (SE) LL UL p r LL UL p
Depressive symptoms
NE inertia (Raw) 0.05 (0.03) 0.00 0.11 0.063 0.04 (0.02) 0.01 0.07 0.016 0.18 0.06 0.28 0.002
NE inertia (Standardized) 0.08 (0.03) 0.03 0.13 0.004 0.03 (0.02) 0.00 0.07 0.029 0.20 0.07 0.33 0.002
PE inertia (Raw) 0.04 (0.02) −0.01 0.09 0.115 0.03 (0.02) −0.01 0.06 0.177 0.12 0.00 0.23 0.045
PE inertia (Standardized) 0.03 (0.02) −0.02 0.08 0.181 0.02 (0.01) −0.01 0.05 0.128 0.12 0.00 0.23 0.044
Rumination
NE inertia (Raw) 0.05 (0.02) 0.00 0.10 0.043 0.04 (0.02) 0.01 0.07 0.007 0.19 0.08 0.30 0.001
NE inertia (Standardized) 0.07 (0.02) 0.02 0.11 0.006 0.05 (0.01) 0.02 0.08 <0.001 0.26 0.15 0.36 <0.001
PE inertia (Raw) 0.04 (0.02) −0.01 0.08 0.109 0.04 (0.02) 0.01 0.07 0.010 0.17 0.06 0.28 0.002
PE inertia (Standardized) 0.02 (0.02) −0.03 0.07 0.442 0.04 (0.01) 0.01 0.07 0.004 0.16 0.04 0.27 0.007
Negative affectivity
NE inertia (Raw) 0.06 (0.02) 0.02 0.10 0.003 0.03 (0.02) 0.00 0.06 0.085 0.20 0.02 0.36 0.027
NE inertia (Standardized) 0.07 (0.02) 0.03 0.11 0.002 0.04 (0.02) 0.00 0.07 0.031 0.21 0.06 0.36 0.006
PE inertia (Raw) 0.03 (0.02) −0.01 0.07 0.168 0.04 (0.02) 0.01 0.08 0.006 0.18 0.06 0.28 0.002
PE inertia (Standardized) 0.02 (0.02) −0.02 0.06 0.381 0.03 (0.01) 0.00 0.06 0.028 0.13 0.02 0.24 0.021
Neuroticism
NE inertia (Raw) 0.04 (0.03) −0.02 0.09 0.166 0.04 (0.02) 0.00 0.07 0.045 0.14 0.03 0.25 0.015
NE inertia (Standardized) 0.08 (0.02) 0.03 0.12 0.002 0.03 (0.02) 0.00 0.07 0.046 0.21 0.04 0.37 0.014
PE inertia (Raw) 0.03 (0.02) −0.02 0.07 0.228 0.04 (0.02) 0.00 0.07 0.037 0.14 0.03 0.25 0.016
PE inertia (Standardized) 0.03 (0.02) −0.02 0.07 0.249 0.03 (0.01) 0.00 0.05 0.051 0.13 0.02 0.24 0.024
Meta-analysis results (based on random-effects models) show the average effect size, r, across Studies 1 and 2.
an = 98 for all analyses using standardized negative emotion scores in Study 1.
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recent suggestions that emotional inertia may be a marker of
depression vulnerability, it remains to be seen whether emotional
inertia can equally be considered a vulnerability factor for
other psychopathologies, such as anxiety, psychosis, or various
personality disorders (see Houben et al., 2015). In particular,
further research with clinical samples is warranted to clarify
whether heightened inertia predicts psychological functioning
among individuals with current or remitted psychopathology
(Höhn et al., 2013; van de Leemput et al., 2014). Finally,
the current studies examined only the subjective feeling
component of emotions. Given that emotions are thought
to involve loosely coupled changes in behavior, physiology,
and subjective experience (Scherer, 2009), there is a need
to study the temporal dynamics of emotions as multi-
componential processes. Preliminary evidence suggests that
various emotion components may show distinct patterns of
temporal dynamics (Koval et al., 2015b). However, additional
research is required to properly characterize how diﬀerent
components of emotions unfold and relate to each other
over time. Despite these limitations, the current studies
make an important contribution to the literature on emotion
dynamics by examining how inertia of both PE and NE,
assessed under controlled laboratory conditions, relates to a
broad range of well-being measures, while controlling for
individual diﬀerences in the mean level and variability of
emotions.
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